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1 Introduction
The debate over foreign aid as an instrument to promote economic growth is controversial.
Whilst the foreign aid sector has become larger and more institutionalised, empirical studies
have failed to consistently identify a positive effect of aid on growth (Boone, 1994; Burnside
and Dollar, 2000). On the other hand, foreign aid to the health sector (also known as
Development Assistance for Health, DAH) has been shown to have substantial effects on
health outcomes (Mishra and Newhouse, 2009, Wilson, 2011) but which remain below the
expected health improvements set by the Millennium Development Goals.
In the related literature, the causes of aid ineffectiveness have been mostly attributed to
the recipient’s behavioural response. Whether under the form of poor quality of institutions
and governance, lack of political accountability, rent-seeking behaviour or interest group
pressures, the failure of foreign aid is often ascribed to the recipient’s unreliability to tackle
development issues as intended by the donor (Svensson, 2000a; Svensson, 2000b; Burnside
and Dollar, 2004). To address this moral hazard problem, the common solution consists
of introducing incentives to the recipient to commit to the intended objectives (Azam and
Laffont, 2003). Attempts to reform aid delivery have incorporated these recommendations
by shifting from stand-alone projects to conditionality for policy reforms and selectivity of
recipients.
The underlying assumption of the aid conditionality approach is that the donor has per-
fect information (or full observability) about the multiple components of the needs in the
country, which includes the identification of sub-populations with the highest disease bur-
den, their geographic locations and the severity of the disease. This information is then used
by the donor to enforce an aid contract with the recipient and achieve the intended develp-
ment objectives. Yet in the absence of reliable data, as it is mostly the case in developing
countries, identifying and finding the beneficiaries of the funded programmes can be a chal-
lenging exercise (Niehaus et al., 2013). Furthermore, targeting may exhibit different levels
of efficiency depending on whether the decisions are taken by the central government or at
the community level (Galasso and Ravallion, 2005, Banerjee et al., 2009) that can ultimately
affect aid effectiveness.
In this study, I explore the consequences of the donor’s imperfect information about
local health needs when the donor chooses whether to impose aid conditionality or not.
More specifically, when the donor has the choice to administer health funding at the central
or sub-national level while only local governments have perfect information about the local
needs, what are the consequences of aid conditionality on the allocation of local health
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resources?
To my knowledge, this is the first attempt to formally examine how foreign aid affects the
distribution of federal transfers in a decentralised health care system. Is aid diversion coming
from the central government’s decision to reduce intergovernmental transfers or is it rather
the consequence of sub-national entities changing their fiscal policy (as frequently observed in
the fiscal federalism literature)? How does DAH affect the allocation of health care resources
across local jurisdictions and the financing of the healthcare system? This paper intends to
address this knowledge gap by exploring the optimal allocation of health resources in a
federal government in the presence of foreign aid. I start by developing a model based on
the standard fiscal federalism literature. I then introduce DAH in the model and discuss the
implications of aid conditionality on local health expenditures and intergovernmental grants.
I find that when the local government is committed to maximise the social welfare of the
neediest and the donor has imperfect information about which group in the local community
has the highest health need, unconditional aid generates the maximum welfare gain for the
neediest health group. I also find that conditional aid increases local health expenditures
more than unconditioned aid. This is because when the donor unsuccessfully targets the
high-need group, the local government attempts to compensate for the misallocation of
resources by increasing domestic health expenditures on the high-need individuals.
The second part of the paper presents the comparative statistic effects of DAH on the
health system of a country with two levels of health care provision. I show that donor pref-
erence for primary health care, as commonly observed, may lead to a reallocation of central
government resources to the secondary health care level when the marginal health benefit
of the neediest is high enough in this level of care. On the other hand, donor mistargeting
and aid conditionality may reduce resources allocated to secondary health care, creating an
unbalanced situation in the health system. The implications of under-funding the secondary
level on aid effectiveness depend on the marginal health benefit of the neediest for this level
of health services. While the assumptions of this model purposely excluded the existence of
local corruption in some developing countries (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004;Bardhan and
Mookherjee, 2005; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006), the results, nonetheless, indicate the
potential hazards of aid conditionality. In particular, conditionality with poor targeting may
undermine the ability of the recipient country to manage health resources at the different
levels of the federal system and exacerbate health inequalities within the country. Further-
more, even if local corruption does exist, through the elite capture for example, the use of
unconditional funds might still be more efficient than conditional aid with poor targeting
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(Basurto et al., 2017).
This work makes several contributions to the literature. First, I introduce a model
with a decentralised economy and discuss how DAH can affect the allocation of health
resources at the different levels of the federal system. The emphasis on aid conditionality
and its consequences on local expenditures reveal that donor’s imperfect information can have
adverse effects on aid effectiveness. In addition, the introduction of an incentive compatibility
constraint, as found in an aid conditionality contract, could divert the recipient’s country
from targeting the highest needs or even lead the donor to select ”bad” government when
the needs are not fully observable.
Second, introducing a decentralised health system reveals that different sub-national en-
tities in a recipient country may have conflicting targeting decisions when local information
does not circulate perfectly. When both the central government and the donor mistarget
the need, the local government may not have the financial and structural capacity to real-
locate funds to the intended beneficiaries. Furthermore, by adding a second level of health
care services, I show that donor’s preferences to achieve immediate and measurable results
through the primary health level may poorly reflect the need of local communities when their
marginal health benefit for second or tertiary health services is higher.
These findings also provide a new theoretical explanation for the empirical evidence of
aid fungibility in the health sector (Howard Pack, 1990; Howar Pack, 1993; Feyzioglu et
al., 1998; Swaroop et al., 2000; McGillivray and Morrissey, 2001; Farag et al., 2009; Van de
Sijpe, 2013). Whilst aid fungibility is a factor for reducing aid effectiveness in the traditional
approach, my results, on the contrary, reveal that fungibility could have positive health
impact when the different levels of the federal government commit to maximising the welfare
of the neediest and the donor mistargets its funds. Pettersson (2007) finds no evidence that
aid fungibility is associated with a reduction in economic or health outcomes, suggesting
that it might not necessarily be detrimental. My findings also closely relate to Wagstaff
(2011) who estimates the consequences of fungibility on the productivity of the recipient
government’s spending. The author shows that spillovers effects might not be limited to aid
project areas and that government reallocation to non-project areas might also benefit from
productivity gains. My theoretical setting offers an alternative plausibility for the resource
reallocation that relies on marginal health gains. In particular, marginal productivity is not
a driver of government’s spending when the latter commits to maximise the welfare of the
neediest. Finally, the results of this model supports the evidence on intrasectoral fungibility
(Walle and Mu, 2007, Wagstaff, 2011): when external funding does not reach the intended
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beneficiaries, local governments reallocate their own resources only within the health sector
to achieve higher health impact.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the related
theoretical and empirical literature. In section 3, I formulate the resource allocation problem
in a decentralised economy and introduce the presence of the donor in primary health care.
Section 4 contains further theoretical analysis with the introduction of another level of care.
The last section contains concluding remarks.
2 Recipient’s Public behaviour and fiscal federalism
The impact of foreign aid on the recipient government’s behaviour has triggered a vivid
literature. A common theoretical approach relies on agency theory to analyse the incentive
problems that may occur in foreign aid delivery leading to aid ineffectiveness. The donor
(Principal) is assumed to be fully altruistic: it cares only about the welfare of the poor.
On the other hand, the recipient government is assumed to be only partly altruistic and
has other incentives than meeting the need of the poor. The recipient may then have
incentives to attract a high share of aid disbursement, deviate from the donor decision and
follow its own objectives, creating adverse selection and moral hazard (Svensson, 2000a).
From the donor’s perspectives, the solution is therefore to implement an aid contract
that incentivises the recipient to comply with its poverty reduction objectives. When
the donor is only able to observe the outcomes, the optimal aid contract is the payment
conditional on the aid having been spent on the intended outputs, also known as ex post
conditionality (Martens et al., 2002; Azam and Laffont, 2003). However, when the donor
only observes some inputs, conditionality (on inputs) may distort project choice (Cordella
and Dell’Ariccia, 2007). In the presence of lobby groups in the recipient country, Lahiri
and Raimondos-Møller (2004) show that the optimal strategic behaviour of the donor
is to announce its reaction function in order to eliminate the issue of fungibility while
maximising the general welfare at the expense of the lobbyists. On the other hand, if
the donor behaves as a leader, increased corruption will diminish the amount of aid. In
this scenario, conditionality leads simply to no aid to the recipient. But the opposite can
also happen as illustrated by the ”Samaritan dilemma”: the recipient maximises its own
utility at the expense of the donor who decides to allocate aid on the basis of poverty
criteria. The recipient government has then incentives to exploit donor’s altruism by
maintaining a level of poverty qualifying for aid. As the donor cannot commit not to help
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the poor, aid is counter productive as long as the recipient can adjust its policy accordingly
(Svensson, 2000b). Arguably, the limit of this approach is that repeat offenders will likely
discourage donors who will be encouraged ultimately to find alternative solutions. The
”Samaritan dilemma” might then exist only for a limited period of time. More globally, this
criticism can be extended to the agency theory approach. Repeat offenders tend to reveal
their inefficiency in spending aid on the intended items, inciting the donor to target new
beneficiaries. Ultimately, ”bad” recipients simply drive out of the aid market, removing
moral hazard and adverse selection issues. The examination of aid fungibility relies
entirely on the assumption made in these studies of a misbehaving recipient. The derived
results from their analytical approaches follow logically the mechanism design of an optimal
contract where the recipient is incentivised to maximise the altruistic objectives of the donor.
One way to circumvent these limits is relax the ”bad” government assumption that
prevails in this related literature and examine the consequences of asymmetric information
on the optimal resource allocations. The source of aid fungibility is consequently not limited
to the moral hazard problem of the recipient but can also reflect the lack of adequate
information available to the donor who is no longer to fully observe the needs. If the
recipient has perfect information about the health needs in its country, diverting aid funds
can be optimal. Naturally, the question raises little interest in this simple case if the local
government and the donor have aligned preferences. The donor should simply transfer its
aid funds to the recipient which uses it to maximise the poverty alleviation objective that
it shares with the donor. However examining this approach is more relevant in a federal
structure, where the central government does not necessarily have perfect information
about the local health needs, contrary to local communities. The latter is supposed to
have better information about local needs. This approach, known as the community-driven
development, is known as a mechanism already largely adopted among policy makers, which
consists of empowering community groups through higher control over planning decisions
and investment resources for local projects. Surprisingly, no studies attempted to use it in
a theoretical model.
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3 The model with primary health care
This section presents a simple model of optimal health resource allocation between the
donor, the central government and the local authority. It aims at examining the comparative
statics effects of foreign aid and intergovernmental grant on local health expenditures,
either when these funds are transferred through budget support to the local government
(unconditional aid), or restricted to a specific intervention (for example, funds conditioned to
be spent on a specific project, or vertical programmes funded and delivered by international
agencies and non-profit organisations1). The objective is to shed light on the mechanisms
that are driving the effectiveness of foreign aid related particularly to the public health
sector behaviour.
A federal economy consists of m communities denoted i = 1, ...,m. In each community,
there is a population of Ni citizens divided into two groups: ill and healthy. For simplicity
and without loss of generality, let Ni = 1. Each community has a proportion πi of ill (P ) and
(1− πi) of healthy members (R). All members of community i are characterized by a local
health need θik (k ∈ {P,R}) that is either high or low with θiP > θiR. Hence, θik reflects
the community characteristics that account for the intercommunity differences in healthcare
preferences for a given provision of healthcare services.
All individuals derive utility from the provision of a public good, that I refer as healthcare
services. I denote gi the amount of health benefits package per capita in community i and
individual’s valuation of the good is given by h(θik, gi). The function h(θik, .) is assumed to be
increasing, smooth and strictly concave in g (for all θk and gk, h2(θk, gk) = ∂h(θk, gk)/∂gk > 0
and h22(θk, gk) = ∂
2h(θk, gk)/∂g
2
k < 0). In addition, the marginal benefit of consumption is
increasing in individual’s type: h12(θk, gk) = ∂
2h(θk, gk)/∂gk∂θk > 0.
Individuals differ also in endowed income yi, with yiR > ci > yiP . The high-need indi-
viduals (who are poor and sick) are not able to pay the user fees to receive primary care
services. For simplicity and without loss of generality, yiP is set equal to zero among high-
need members 2.
1Note that vertical programmes such as immunization are usually financed through funds that do not
go through the government budget. However, since I assume that the local government allocates the funds
in accordance to the donor’s decision, I do not need to distinguish this particular case. The funds will be
similarly spent on the intended targeted area whether they are transferred under conditional form to the
local government or directly targeted by the donor.
2The assumption that wealthy people are also healthy is employed to focus on the main interest of the
model, foreign aid and the financial constraint of the poor. In as much as wealthy people can afford the
health expenditures to be cured, their health status is only temporary and does not motivate for donor
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Healthcare provision is decentralized to local governments. These governments are
responsive to the welfare of both subgroups in the community, high-need and low-need.
Within each community, health services are supplied at a unit cost q, such that q′(.) < 0 and
q′′(.) > 0. I assume that there is no private market for health care. As it happens in most
low-income countries, local governments are not able to collect local taxes but finance the
provision of healthcare through fiscal grants and foreign aid (Bardhan, 2002). To part-fund
the universally available health benefits package g, local communities impose user fee ci
per unit of health services. Since yiP is set equal to zero, only wealthy people are charged
the user fee. Since this financing system is non-coercive, the local government problem
of optimal health resource provision has to respect the voluntary participation constraint
of the low-need (wealthy) members, h(θiR, giR) ≥ cgiR. Therefore, local governments face
challenges in raising local revenues to support health expenditures when the share π of
high-need is high.
The central government is responsible for raising revenues and allocating health resources
to each community through a lump-sump grant, ai. In the presence of the donor, I assume
that this grant is restricted to the high-need subgroup in each community, as is foreign aid d.
Therefore, the central government and the donor have fully aligned objectives. They both
have information about the level of total needs among each community through information
provided by local governments. Therefore, the central government and the donor determine
respectively the optimal fiscal grant ai and aid d to transfer based on the need within each
community i, depending on π and θiP . However, they do not know how needs are distributed
within each community, except with a probability p1 for the central government and p2 for
the donor, that the need in a local group k of the community i is θik, with p1, p2 ∈ [0, 1].
Hence, if either the central government or the donor decides to identify a subgroup within
community i, its probability of success is pi, and with probability 1 − pi, it identifies the
high-need (low-need) subgroup as being the low-need (high-need). In addition, the central
government adapts its fiscal grant transfer to the existing health care resources. When
there is only the local government resources, the central transfer a grant agi = a
g
i (gi, πθiP )
that depends on local health care expenditures and local needs in community i. However,
in the presence of the donor, the central government transfers ai = a(d, πθiP ) to the
community i, with d the foreign aid resources3. On the contrary, the local government has
funding.
3Note that agi and ai are different functions since I allow for the existence of a different effect of a change
of local government spending and a change of foreign aid on the central government’s fiscal grant. Indeed,
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perfect information about the distribution of the needs in the community, but it can have
different preferences over high and low-need members. Specifically, the local government
assigns a weight µik to each group within community i with µik,∈ [0, 1]. If µik = 1, the
local government only cares about its high-need members and its preferences are then fully
aligned with those of the central government and the donor. However, I will not restrict the
following analysis to this specific case and I will rather let µik,∈ [0, 1]. I also assume that
the local government seeks to achieve horizontal and vertical equity. That is, individuals
with the same needs receive equal amount of health care, and those with higher needs
receive higher amount of health care. Therefore, health care resources distribution are based
on need and financed by the nonpoors (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer, 2000).
In this analysis, fungibility is examined under the assumption that neither the local gov-
ernment nor the the central government diverts aid for their private benefit. Likewise, there
is no form of capture by local elites or group pressure. These conditions posit assumptions
that lead de facto to fungibility. This study focuses on assessing the extent of diversion
of funds (fungibility of aid) when only the local government (fund’s recipient) has perfect
information about local health needs. In the first section, there is no donor and I examine
how conditional grant affects the optimal allocation decision for local health resources. In
the second section, I introduce the donor and analyse the effects of conditional grant and
aid local health expenditures and social welfare.
3.1 Determination of fiscal grant
I start by assuming that in absence of the donor, both central and local governments maxi-
mize their social welfare function with respect to their own preferences for the sick. However,
when the donor will be introduced in the second part, the central government will only care
about the sick to fully align its objective function with the donor. The fiscal grants are
financed by a national income tax τ that is common to every community. The central
government determines the optimal fiscal grant ai from the following objective function
Max
aip,aiR
∑
i
Ni{πiλipθiph(gip + aip) + (1− πi)λiRθiRh(giR + aiR) + yi(1− τ)]}
under the assumption of the central government’s imperfect information of local health needs, an increase in
the level of foreign aid in community i could have stronger effects on the fiscal grant than a change in local
spending
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where λik is the weight given by the central government for group k in community i. The
central government’s budget constraint is given by
m∑
i=1
Ni(1− πi)yiτ ≥
m∑
i=1
Niqiai (1)
where ai = πiaip + (1− πi)aiR.
Since the budget constraint (1) must bind, the fiscal grant transferred to community i is
determined by
h′(gi + aip) =
λR (q
′
i(Gi)ai + qi(Gi))
λipθip
(2)
and
h′(gi + aiR) =
q′i(Gi)ai + qi(Gi)
θiR
(3)
where the total provision of the private good in community i is Gi = gi+ ai. In this setting,
the first-order conditions determine the quantity of health care services provided by the
central government. The grant received by the high-need subgroup is a function of local
price of health services, local health needs, the share of high-need members in community
i, the local health expenditures and the weight assigned by the central government to the
low and high-need group within each community. Hence, it follows that the marginal rate
of substitution between aip and aiR is
h′(gi + aip)
h′(gi + aiR)
=
θiR
θip
λR
λip
(4)
3.2 Determination of local public provision of health care with
domestic resources
I assume that the local government of community i maximizes its social welfare function
with respect to its own preferences for the sick. The central government has the choice to
transfer the fiscal grant as an unrestricted budget support to community i or to impose the
grant to being spent on a specific group within the community. In both cases, the central
government allocates resources agi qi that pay for the price of health care services to reach a
given level of health care per capita agi . For simplicity, I assume that the central government
only targets the poor who are also the high-need individuals.
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Unconditional fiscal grant
If the central government decides to transfer an unconditional (without use restrictions)
lump sum grant per capita ai to community i, the optimal local expenditures for the provision
of health services selected by the local government solves
Max
Gc
iP
,Gc
iR
{πiµiPh(θP , G
c
iP ) + (1− πi)µiR[h(θR, G
c
iR)− cigiR]}
subject to the budget constraint:
qi(G
c
i)G
c
i ≤ (1− πi)cigiR + a
g
i qi(G
c
i)
where the total provision of health services for group k is denoted by Gcik = gik+ a
g
i with
gi = πigip + (1 − πi)giR. Note that the budget constraint requires giR ≤ a
g
i to hold (which
correspond to the case where πi = 1). Then, the total provision of health resources in the
community i is
Gci = πG
c
iP + (1− π)G
c
iR
= gi + a
g
i
= πgiP + (1− π)giR + a
g
i
For ease of notation, I drop the subscript i. The social welfare function of the local govern-
ment is given by the utility function of the high and low need, as well as the weight that
it attributes to each group. The local government’s budget constraint is obtained from the
funds locally raised on the wealthy and the fiscal grant transfer. Since the budget constraint
must bind, the total public provision of health care services is given by:
h2(θP , G
c
P ) =
µR
µP
(q′(Gc)g + q(Gc)) (5)
h2(θR, G
c
R) = q
′(Gc)g + q(Gc) (6)
The optimal expenditure quantity depends on the relative weight assigned by the local
government to the sick and the marginal cost for producing the good. As the preferences
of the local government for the low-need diminishes in favour of the high-need, the ratio
µR/µP decreases and the provision of the health benefits package for the sick increases. As
expected, health care expenditures depend positively on the local needs and negatively on
the local price.
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The slope of the social welfare contour is given by the marginal rate of substitution
between the public provision of health care to the high and low-need individuals
h2(θP , G
c
p)
h2(θR, GcR)
=
µR
µP
(7)
Given the parameters (µk, θk), the optimal public provision of health care to the
high-need members is maximal when the low-need members receive no share of the
fiscal and the local government gives no weight to the welfare of the low-need members
(µR = 0). Consequently, the marginal rate of substitution in (7) can be interpreted as an
”equity weight” related to the two subgroups (Dolan and Tsuchiya, 2009). An increase
(decrease) in this ratio would decrease (increase) the level of healthcare of the high need
relative to the low need group. Note that if the local government has equal preferences
between low and high-need members of its community (utilitarian approach), (7) leads
to h2(θR, G
c
R) = h2(θP , G
c
P ) which implies that gP > gR since the marginal benefit of
consumption is increasing in individual’s type: h12(θk, gk) > 0 and θip > θiR. The marginal
rate of substitution of the provision of health care between high and low need group is
only a function of their relative local needs. Higher marginal health benefit of individuals
results in a higher allocation of public good under the utilitarian approach. When the
local government only cares about the high-need members (Rawlsian approach) the lat-
ter receives the maximum amount G¯∗P of health care defined by h2(θP , G¯
∗
P ) = q
′(Gc)g+q(Gc).
There exists a threshold θ∗k(q,Gk, µk) that depends on the total provision of health
service, the marginal cost, and the weight on group k such that local government is fi-
nancially constrained when the local need exceeds θ∗k. Assume from now on that it is the case.
Conditional grant
Suppose now that the central government decides to restrict the grant to the poor mem-
bers in the local community i. That is, the local government has to allocate the fiscal grant
according to the central government’s decision. This kind of grant is also known as earmarked
grant. The central earmarks the fiscal grant on the high-need group of the community with
probability p1, but can also incorrectly designate the low-need group as the fiscal grant re-
ceiver. As bin the previous case, the central government uses the grant a. Therefore, the
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maximization’s problem of the local government becomes:
Max
gP ,gR
{
[
µPπh(θP , G
c
p) + µR(1− π)h(θR, gR)
]
p1
+
[
µPπh(θP , gp) + µR(1− π)h(θR, G
c
pR)
]
(1− p1)− µR(1− π)cgR}
subject to the new budget constraint:
q(Gc)g ≤ (1− π)cgR (8)
where GcpR = gR + a
g and Gcp = gp + a
g. The first-order conditions for this problem yield:
h2(θP , G
c
p)p1 + h2(θP , gP )(1− p1) =
µR
µP
(q′(Gc)g + q(Gc)) (9)
h2(θR, gR)p1 + h2(θR, G
c
pR)(1− p1) = q
′(Gc)g + q(Gc) (10)
The optimal provision of health benefits packages to the high-need subgroup are then to be
compared with the case of unconditional grant to determine if conditional grant can benefit
the welfare of the sick. Consider now the difference between (5) and (9). The comparison
between the two results can only be done when the local government preferences are aligned
with the central government: the local government would only care about the sick. By letting
the ratio µR/µP = 0 in the two equations, it appears that if q
′(.) < 0, the expected health
care provision transferred to high-need individuals under conditional grant is lower than the
certain provision they receive under unconditional grant. The conditionality imposed by
the central government affects negatively the amount of health public goods allocated to
the high-need subgroup. When the central government does not have perfect information,
it gives some probability weight to allocate health resources out of high-need individuals to
the low-need members in the community. Combining (9) and (10) yields the marginal rate
of substitution between the level of health of high and low-need individuals
h2(θP , G
c
p)
h2(θR, gR)
=
µR
µP
−
1− p1
p1
1
h2(θR, gR)
(
h2(θP , gP )−
µR
µp
h2(θR, G
c
pR)
)
(11)
Assuming that gk ≤ a
g, if µP > µR, then the second term on the right hand side is positive.
The comparison of (11) with the marginal rate of substitution under unconditional grant
(7) (and letting µR/µP = 0), it results that conditional grant reduces the health resource
allocation gap between high and low-need individuals in the community that was prevailing
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under unconditional grant. The high-need members are then worse off and the low-need
better off.
Consider now the effects of fiscal grants on local expenditures. Totally differentiating (9)
gives the marginal propensity to spend on the sick out of conditional grant
∂g∗P
∂ag
= −
1− 1− p1 + µRµP κc(1−pi)−q′(Gc)h22(θP ,gP )
p1
h22(θP ,G
c
P
)
h22(θP ,gP )
+ 1− p1 − π
µR
µP
κc
h22(θP ,gP )
 (12)
where κc = q
′′(Gc)Gc + 2q′(Gc). A straightforward result from (12) is that the highest
increase in local health expenditures is reached when p1 = 0 as the local government seeks to
compensate for the excessive grant allocated to the low-need individuals. On the contrary,
an increase in the probability of the central government to successfully determine the local
need reduces the only positive term of the equation. As expected, the share of high-need
members in the community also negatively affects the propensity of the local government to
spend on the ill out of conditional grant.
3.3 Public provision of health care resources with foreign aid
I introduce in this section the intervention of a donor which cares only about the high-need
members in the community. The donor can decide to give aid as an unconditional fund
transfer to the local government, or finance directly a subgroup of its choice within the
community. If aid is given to the local government, the latter simply adds the external fund
on top of the total amount of public provision. However, if the donor decides to fund directly
a local area of its choice (vertical programme), it can only identify the high-need group with
a probability p2 that the need θik of the group P is θiP . That is, p2 is the probability that
foreign aid reaches the sick. Because the donor cares only about the sick, both the central
and local government align their preferences with the donor to cooperate. Therefore, the
fiscal grant a is restricted to benefit the high-need subgroups in each community. Notice an
important implication of this theoretical setting. The local government follows the decision
of both the donor and the central government when they decide to transfer conditional
funds. That is, there is no distinction between the case where the local government receives
grants to be spent on a specific group in the community by directly contracting with the
donor (this restricted budget support is also known as earmarked aid) and the case where
the donor or the central government directly finances the intended group. In both cases,
the local government has only a decision-making power over its own resources and funds
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received as unrestricted budget support. Similarly, whether the donor transfers funds at the
central or local level makes no difference on the examination of local health resources. This
is because this analysis does not focus on factors related to a misbehaving recipient that
would directly explain aid diversion. I rather assume a collaborative partnership between
the donor and the recipient at the central and local levels and I examine the implications
of imperfectly informed donor and central government and local health expenditures.
Therefore the factor of interest is only the decision of the donor to allocate its funds to
a specific group within the community or to provide an unrestricted budget support to
the local government. I also assume that the central government knows about the donor’s
intervention (whether through unrestricted budget support or conditional aid) and has
the possibility to adapt accordingly the intergovernmental grant a(d). A straightforward
source of aid diversion appears if the central government decides to reduce its fiscal grant
accordingly. In addition to this possibility, I will also examine other conditions under this
theoretical setting that could lead to reallocation of health care resources.
There are four cases to consider for this comparative statics analysis reflecting the possi-
bility that both aid d and grant a can be transferred directly or indirectly to the high-need
group in the community. In both cases, the donor and the central government have to include
the local price of health care services to reach the sick with the intended level of health care
resources d and a respectively. In all four cases, the local authority maximises the community
aggregate welfare function of high-need and low-need individuals subject to the total health
care amount available (GP , GR) to each group and the probability that national government
and/or the donor successfully target the high-need group. Since individuals have the same
welfare level within groups, the aggregate welfare function of each group is defined as
W P (GP ) = h(θp, G
P )
WR(GR) = h(θR, G
R)− cGR
In the following four cases, the aggregate welfare functions will differ only with respect to
(GP , GR). The benefit of health resource allocation is measured by the variation in welfare
for each subgroup.
Case 1. Unconditional grant a and aid d
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Consider the case where the local government receives unconditional grant and aid. It
means that it can use grant and aid on top of its own revenue to determine the per capita
level of health care expenditures that it seeks to achieve for the high (GdP ) and the low-need
individuals (GdR). The local government then solves
Max
Gd
P
,Gd
R
{πµPW
P (θP , G
d
P ) + (1− π)µRW
R(θR, G
d
R)}
subject to the aggregate budget constraint:
q(Gd)Gd ≤ (1− π)cgR + (a(d) + d)q(G
d)
where Gd is the total provision of health resources and each subgroup in the community
receives Gdk = gk + a(d) + d with k ∈ {P,R}. Then it follows that
Gd = πGdP + (1− π)G
d
R
= g + a(d) + d
= πgP + (1− π)gR + a(d) + d
Define the price elasticity of health care expenditures is defined as
e(Gd) =
q
Gd
dGd
dq
As in (5), if both aid and fiscal grant are transferred to the budget of the local government,
the optimal resource allocation is given by the marginal change in social welfare of the
high-need with respect to total health care expenditures
∂W P (θP , G
d
p)
∂GdP
=
µR
µP
(
q′(Gd)g + q(Gd)
)
=
µR
µP
q(Gd)
(
1 +
1
e(Gd)
g
Gd
)
(13)
and the second-order condition is
h22(θP , G
d
p)−
µR
µP
κd < 0
where κd = q
′′(Gd)Gd + 2q′(Gd). The first-order condition indicates that welfare benefits
for the high-need individuals depend on the relative preferences of the local government
between high-need and low-need subgroups and the price elasticity of health expenditure.
16
The maximum marginal welfare of the high-need is reached when the local government gives
no weight to the welfare of the low-need members (Rawlsian case) or when the price elasticity
of health care expenditures is equal, in absolute value, to the share of local government health
expenditures to the total health expenditures in the community (
∣∣e(Gd)∣∣ = g/Gd). Because
of the limited financial capacity of the local government revenue in low-income countries, it
is reasonable to assume that the share of local government health expenditures to the total
health expenditures is low as well. Consequently, the marginal welfare of the sick is maximal
only if total health care expenditures are highly price-inelastic. Yet, the lack of empirical
evidence on the price elasticity in low-income countries precludes from asserting that this
condition holds.
Recall that the threshold θ∗k(q,Gk, µk) characterises the maximum local need above which
the local government is financially constrained. As this threshold increases with aid and fiscal
grant, the local government can reach a larger share of high-need members in the community
when aid or grant increases. The concern about aid fungibility requires that ∂GdP/∂d ≥ 1.
If the local government is financially constrained, avoiding fungibility of aid requires that
neither local government’s spending nor fiscal grant decreases in the presence of aid. However
since this condition is only related to total health expenditures GdP , it is insufficient to inform
us about the impact of foreign aid on local health care expenditures nor about the critical
role of local government in analysing fungibility of aid. Therefore, I analyse the effects of
aid on the optimal local expenditures by totally differentiating (13) to obtain the following:
∂g∗P
∂d
= −(a′(d) + 1)
(
1−
1− π − q
′(Gd)
κd
π˜d − π
)
(14)
where π˜d =
h22(θP ,G
d
p)
κd
µP
µR
and κd = q
′′(Gd)g + 2q′(Gd). The optimal local health expenditures
increase with foreign aid, provided that fiscal grant does not decline.
Proposition 1. Unconditional foreign aid increases local government spending on the sick
when κd > 0 and sufficiently close to 0 and a
′(d) > −1.
Proof. Assuming a′(d) ≥ −1, the condition under which
∂g∗P
∂d
> 0 is
1−
1− π − q
′(Gd)
κd
π˜d − π
< 0
1 <
1− π − q
′(Gd)
κd
π˜d − π
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If κd < 0, the second-order condition implies that
h22(θP , G
d
p)−
µR
µP
κd < 0
π˜d > 1
This yields to the following
π˜d − π < 1− π −
q′(Gd)
κd
q′(Gd)
κd
< 1− π˜d < 0
which is in contradiction with q
′(Gd)
κd
> 0 since q′(Gd) < 0 and κd < 0.
Assume now that κd > 0. The second-order condition then leads to
π˜d < 1
which implies that
π˜d − π > 1− π −
q′(Gd)
κd
if π˜d < π. One condition for this last inequality to hold is κd sufficiently close to 0. Note
that
κd = q
′′(Gd)g + 2q′(Gd)
= q′(Gd)
(
q′′(Gd)
q′(Gd)
+ 2
)
The term in the parenthesis refers to the convexity (or curvature) of the inverse demand
function. Note also that if the need θP of the sick is very high, this last inequality always
holds and the marginal propensity to spend aid received on the sick can be positive even if
the local government has a higher relative preference for the low-need group.
The optimal allocations of health resources critically depend on the share of the high-need
group in the community: given the preferences of the local government for each subgroup in
the community, µP and µR, high-need members receive a lower share of health care services
as π increases. Consider the condition under which ∂g∗P/∂d > 0, requiring π˜
d < 1. As the
share of poor individuals in the community gets closer to π˜d, the marginal propensity to
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spend out of aid increases. Nonetheless when the share of the poor gets too high (π > π˜d),
foreign aid has negative effects. This is because π˜d is a function of the relative preferences
of high-need and low-need individuals as well as the local health needs. Therefore, if the
local government’s preferences for low-need increase or if the local health needs decrease,
π˜d will decrease and the additional external fund of the donor becomes an opportunity to
reallocate the local government’s resources away from the high-need to the low-need group
within the community. However these considerations are valid when the local government
attributes the weights µpP and µR to the high-need and low-needs subgroups respectively. It
means that the local government’s preferences are misaligned with those of the donor (and
the central government) who cares only about the high-need subgroup. Hence, a special
attention should be devoted on the effects of aid on local health expenditures when the ratio
µR/µP tends to zero. Equation (14) becomes
∂g∗P
∂d
∣∣∣∣
µP
µR
=0
= −(a′(d) + 1) (15)
As a consequence, foreign aid affects negatively local health expenditures unless the central
government reduces its fiscal grant by more than one. When the donor, the central and local
government’s preferences are fully aligned, there is no rationale for the local government to
increase its health expenditures following foreign aid.
Case 2. Unconditional Grant a and conditional aid d
Consider the situation where the donor targets its aid to a specific subgroup in the community
while the central government transfers an unconditional grant to the local government. The
local government maximises the following objective function
max
Gc
P
,Gc
R
[
πµPW
P (θP , G
d
P ) + (1− π)µRW
R(θR, G
c
R)
]
p2
+
[
πµPW
P (θP , G
c
P ) + (1− π)µRW
R(θR, G
d
pR)
]
(1− p2)
s.t. q(Gd)Gc ≤ (1− π)cgR + a(d)q(G
d)
where GdpR = G
d
R + d. The change in the budget constraint reflects the impact of con-
ditional aid on the local government’s new budget: the local government is now only able
to allocate Gc in the community while the price remains a function of the total health ex-
penditures Gd. The local government gets its funding from the user fee collected on the
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low health-need group as well as from the transfer from the central government. The total
marginal welfare of the high-need individuals is given by
∂W P (θP , G
d
p)
∂GcP
p2 +
∂W P (θP , G
c
P )
∂GcP
(1− p2) =
µR
µP
q(Gd)
(
1 +
1
e(Gd)
g
Gd
)
(16)
Sufficient conditions for this to be the unique maximum are
h22(θP , G
d
P )p2 + h22(θP , G
c
P )(1− p2)−
µR
µP
(q′′(Gd)g + q′(Gd)) < 0 (17)
As expected, if the donor has perfect information about local needs in the community
(p2 = 1), the marginal social welfare of the high-need is unchanged whether there is aid
is conditional or not. However if p2 < 1, since G
d
P > G
c
P the social welfare of the high-need
individuals is lower under conditional aid. Indeed, the total marginal welfare (right-hand side
of the equation) is similar to case 1, while the change in social welfare is now split between
a ”high” state of welfare where the high-need individuals receive a quantity of health care
services equal to Gdp with a probability p2 and a ”low” state of welfare where they receive a
quantity GcP with probability 1 − p2 which corresponds to the level of health expenditures
where there is no donor.
Proposition 2. If the donor has imperfect information about the local health need, condi-
tional aid decreases the social welfare of the high-need individuals.
How does an exogenous increase in conditional aid affect the local government spending
on high-need individuals? Using the Implicit Function Theorem on (16), I obtain:
∂g∗P
∂d
= −(a′(d) + 1)
1− pic(1−p2)a′(d)+1 + 1− π − q′(Gd)κd
π˜dp2 + π˜c(1− p2)− π
 (18)
where π˜k =
h22(θP ,G
k
p)
κd
µP
µR
and κd = q
′′(Gd)g + 2q′(Gd).
Consider now the effects of conditional aid with those arising from the situation when both
aid and grant are unconditional (14).
Proposition 3. Conditional aid decreases the marginal propensity to spend on the sick
relatively to unconditional aid and increases fungibility when π < π˜c, a′(d) > −1 and p2 is
close to 1.
When the donor targets its funding to the high-need group in the community but mis-
takenly reaches the low-need, high-need individuals get under-allocated compared to the
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situation where aid is unconditional. As a consequence, the local government increases its
spending on health services to the high-need group to compensate for the misallocation of
foreign aid.
Proof. Subtracting (18) to (14) gives
∂g∗P
∂d
∣∣∣∣
unconditional-aid
−
∂g∗P
∂d
∣∣∣∣
conditional-aid
=
1− π − q
′(Gd)
κd
π˜d − π
−
pic(1−p2)
a′(d)+1
+ 1− π − q
′(Gd)
κd
π˜dp2 + π˜c(1− p2)− π
Assume that a′(d) > −1 and κd < 0. Then 1 − π −
q′(Gd)
κd
< pi
c(1−p2)
a′(d)+1
− q
′(Gd)
κd
+ 1 − π under
the condition that
π˜c(1− p2)
a′(d) + 1
> 0
which holds under the present assumptions (a′(d) > −1 and κd < 0).
In addition, since GdP > G
c
p, π˜
d > π˜dp2 + π˜
c(1− p2). Now if π ≤ π˜
c < 1, then
1− π − q
′(Gd)
κd
π˜d − π
−
pic(1−p2)
a′(d)+1
+ 1− π − q
′(Gd)
κd
π˜ddp2 + π˜
c(1− p2)− π
< 0
∂g∗P
∂d
∣∣∣∣
unconditional-aid
<
∂g∗P
∂d
∣∣∣∣
conditional-aid
In addition, note under the particular case where the donor targets the high-need group
with perfect information (p2 = 1), (18) becomes
∂g∗P
∂d
= −(a′(d) + 1)
(
1−
1− π − q
′(Gd)
κd
π˜d − π
)
which is lower than the same partial effect in case 1 where aid and grant are unconditional
(14). It means that the increase in local government health expenditures on the high-need
group is lower when aid is conditional, even if the donor has perfect information about
local health needs. On the opposite, the maximum increasing effect of foreign aid on local
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government’s expenditures is reached when p2 = 0.
∂g∗P
∂d
= −(a′(d) + 1)
1− pica′(d)+1 + 1− π − q′(Gd)κd
π˜c − π

In this case, the partial effects of aid on local health expenditures on the high-need group
are higher when aid is conditional. This corresponds to the maximum of health resources
the local government can reallocate when the donor targets entirely the low-need group
at the expenses of the high-need group and π < π˜c. Consequently, the misallocation of
the donor’s resources entirely dictates the effects of aid on local health expenditures on
high-need individuals.
The case 3 where grant is conditional and aid is unconditional is left in the Appendix.
The next and final case will then focus on conditional grant and aid.
Case 4. Conditional grant a and aid d
Consider now the final case where both the donor and the central government impose
restriction on the funds they transfer to the local government. The donor decides where aid
should be allocated within the community. As the donor does not know the need of the
local community, it can only make a guess with probability p2 that an identified group in
the community correspond to a high-need group. The level of fungibility is then given by
dGdP = (a
′(d)p1 + p2)dd. It follows that dG
d
P/dd ≥ 1 if a
′(d) ≥ (1 − p2)/p1. In this setting,
fungibility is avoided if the central government’s response to foreign aid is higher than the
right hand term which depends on the probability of successful targeting of both the donor
and the central government. Therefore, imperfect information of the donor and the central
government is likely to increase the level of aid fungibility. The maximization’s problem of
the local government becomes :
max
gP ,gR
[
πµPW
P (θP , G
d
p) + (1− π)µRW
R(θR, gR)
]
p1p2
+
[
πµPW
P (θP , G
s
P ) + (1− π)µRW
R(θR, G
c
pR)
]
(1− p1)p2
+
[
πµPW
P (θP , G
c
P ) + (1− π)µRW
R(θR, G
d
pR)
]
p1(1− p2)
+
[
πµPW
P (θP , gP ) + (1− π)µRW
R(θR, G
d
R)
]
(1− p1)(1− p2)
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subject to: q(Gd)g ≤ (1− π)cgR
with GdR = gR + a(d) + d. Note how the change in the budget constraint of the local
government reflects the conditional aid and fiscal grant: the local government is left with
its own funding raised from the user fee on the low-need group to provide health services
g at the price q(Gd) that is determined by the total provision of health services, including
conditional aid and grant. The derived optimal allocation to the high-need members is
expressed as follows
∂W P (θP , G
d
P )
∂gP
p1p2+
∂W P (θP , G
s
P )
∂gP
(1−p1)p2+
∂W P (θP , G
c
P )
∂gP
p1(1−p2)+
∂W P (θP , gP )
∂gP
(1−p1)(1−p2)
=
µR
µP
q(Gd)
(
1 +
1
e(Gd)
g
Gd
)
(19)
Comparing the optimal allocations for high-need individuals with the three other cases, it is
straightforward that combining conditional aid and grant reduces the amount of health care
services to the high-need group, if p1 and p2 are lower than one. The extent of welfare loss
is once again related to the welfare difference between W (θP , G
d
P ) and W (θP , gP ), provided
that the last term corresponds to the lowest social welfare of the high-need. Consequently,
the higher the probability weight attributed to the marginal welfare of the high-need group,
the higher is the welfare loss of conditional grant and aid compared to unrestricted budget
support as in case 1. Whilst the local government cannot prevent the misallocation of condi-
tional aid and grant, it can mitigate the unintended increase in the welfare of the low-need
relatively to the high-need by reallocating a higher share of its own health expenditures.
However, the local government also faces a higher price (q(Gd)) compared to the absence of
conditional grant and aid (q(g)) while remaining with the same fixed budget. Therefore, the
local government’s capacity to divert its local funds may be insufficient to compensate for
the misallocated resources of the central and the donor.
I now characterize the marginal propensity of local health spending on high-need out of
aid and compare it with the previous cases.
Proposition 4. Conditional aid causes the marginal propensity of spending on the sick out
of aid to increase, provided that p2 < 1 and a
′(d) is negative or close to 0.
The misallocation of the donor’s fund related to its willingness to target the high-need
group forces the local government to increase its own health expenditures to the high-need
individuals, under the condition that the fiscal grant remains unchanged. Intuitively, an
increase in fiscal grant to the local community would attenuate the increase in local health
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spending on the sick.
Proof. I use the Implicit Function Theorem to derive the marginal effect of foreign aid on
the optimal local health expenditures.
dg∗P
dd
= −(a′(d) + 1)
(
1−
a′(d)
a′(d)+1
p2(1−p1)pis+
1
a′(d)+1
p1(1−p2)pic+(1−p1)(1−p2)pi
gP+1−pi−
q′(Gd)
κd
p1p2pid+p2(1−p1)pis+p1(1−p2)pic+(1−p1)(1−p2)pi
gP−pi
)
(20)
where π˜k =
h22(θp,Gkp)
κd
µp
µR
. I analyse the marginal propensity to spend on high-need individuals
out of foreign aid by comparing the case where aid is conditional (20) with unconditional
aid and conditional grant (31 in the Appendix). If p2 = 1, the effects are similar to case
3 where only aid is unconditional. However, if p2 < 1 conditional aid has larger impact on
local government expenditures than unconditional aid. Analysing the difference between
(20) and (31) boils down to examining the sign of the following
a′(d)
a′(d)+1
π˜s(1− p1) + 1− π −
q′(Gd)
κd
π˜dp1 + π˜s(1− p1)− π
−
a′(d)
a′(d)+1
p2(1− p1)π˜
s + 1
a′(d)+1
p1(1− p2)π˜
c + (1− p1)(1− p2)π˜
gP + 1− π − q
′(Gd)
κd
p1p2π˜d + p2(1− p1)π˜s + p1(1− p2)π˜c + (1− p1)(1− p2)π˜gP − π
Notice that π˜dp1+π˜
s(1−p1)−π > p1p2π˜
d+p2(1−p1)π˜
s+p1(1−p2)π˜
c+(1−p1)(1−p2)π˜
gP −π
and a
′(d)
a′(d)+1
π˜s(1−p1) >
a′(d)
a′(d)+1
p2(1−p1)π˜
s+ 1
a′(d)+1
p1(1−p2)π˜
c+(1−p1)(1−p2)π˜
gP , provided
that a′(d) is negative or close to 0. As a consequence,
∂g∗P
∂d
∣∣∣∣
case3
−
∂g∗P
∂d
∣∣∣∣
case4
< 0
It should be specified that these results also hold when (µR/µP = 0): the local
government only seeks to maximise the welfare of the high-need subgroup in the com-
munity. This special scenario is an important consideration since the donor and the
central government only cares about the sick. Therefore, even when the donor, the central
and local government have fully aligned objective, conditional aid increases local health
expenditures. These results should be weighted against those obtained under unconditional
aid and grant (case 1). When preferences are aligned, conditionality increases local health
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expenditures at the expenses of the local government’s efforts to compensate for the mis-
allocation of aid and grant. However, as the probability of rightly targeting the high-need
group get close to one, the increase of local health expenditures to the sick subgroup reduces.
The marginal propensity of health expenditures to sick out of conditional grant is obtained
by totally differentiating (19)
∂g∗P
∂a
= −
(
1−
π˜s(1− p1)p2 + π˜
gP (1− p1)(1− p2) + 1− π −
q′(Gd)
κd
p1p2π˜d + p2(1− p1)π˜s + p1(1− p2)π˜c + (1− p1)(1− p2)π˜gP − π
)
(21)
When the donor does not have perfect information about the distribution of local health
needs, fiscal grants transferred to local communities are reduced. The fungibility of foreign
aid can then be avoided only at the expenses of an increased burden on local fiscal policy.
The examination of (21) and (35) (case 3 in the Appendix) demonstrates that conditional
aid and grant reduce the marginal propensity of spending out of conditional grant.
Proposition 5. Conditional aid increases the marginal propensity of the local government
to spend on the high-need individuals out of the conditional grant when 0 < p1 < 1 and
0 < p2 < 1.
Proposition 5 is proven in the Appendix.
The final question of interest concerns the varying of p1 and p2. From (19) I obtain
∂gp
∂p1
= −
p2(h′′(gdp)−h
′′(Gsp))+(1−p2)(h
′′(Gcp)−h
′′(gp)
h′′(Gdp)p1p2+h
′′(Gcp)p1(1−p2)+h
′′(Gsp)(1−p1)p2+h
′′(gp)(1−p1)(1−p2)−pi
µR
µp
κd
< 0
∂gP
∂p2
= −
p1(h′′(gdP )−h
′′(GcP ))+(1−p1)(h
′′(GsP )−h
′′(gP )
h′′(Gd
P
)p1p2+h′′(GcP )p1(1−p2)+h
′′(Gs
P
)(1−p1)p2+h′′(gP )(1−p1)(1−p2)−pi
µR
µP
κd
< 0
As the probabilities of successful targeting decrease, the local government has to increase
its health expenditures to avoid a reduction in the welfare of the high-need relative to the
low-need members. Therefore, the local government reallocates its health resources to target
subgroups characterized by higher marginal health benefits. Nonetheless, the imperfect
information setting creates a financial burden on the budget of the local government whose
limited capacity may not permit it to reach its desired welfare level of the high-need relative
to the low-need individuals.
The role of conditionality of health resources and its associated probability of successful
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Figure 1: Health Benefits Based on Conditional and Unconditional Health Resources
targeting can be described as follows. If either fiscal grant or foreign aid is conditional, the
probability weight of misallocating the health resources reduces the welfare of the high-need,
as illustrated in fig. 1. The welfare loss of the sick, denoted △W is a decreasing function of
the probability of successful target and is decreasing with h(g), the minimum health benefit
obtained by the sick in the absence of foreign aid and fiscal grant. Notice that when the
total health expenditures are conditioned (Gcondit = pG
d + (1 − p)g), the level of welfare
derived from this health care provision is similar to the welfare level obtained from the
unconditional health provision Gd1 which is lower than Gcondit. Consequently, the imperfect
information setting generates a loss in external health resources △G that corresponds to
the ineffectiveness of grant or foreign aid. In particular, the extent of health expenditure
loss is given by △G = −(p(1 − p)/2h′′(Gcondit)/h
′(Gcondit). This inefficiency increases with
the concavity of the valuation function h(.) and decreases with the probability of successful
target.
These comparative statics results reveal some specific features about the response of the
local government expenditures to different modalities of transfer of funds. When the donor
(or the central government) has imperfect information about the local needs, conditional aid
is only benefiting the low-need group. Reducing aid diversion through targeted programs
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mostly improves the welfare of high-need individuals if the donor and the central government
have perfect information or if the donor has perfect information and the central government
transfers an unconditional grant to the local government. Other cases will necessarily lead
to higher fungibility of aid.
4 Introducing two levels of health care
The examination of aid diversion and the effects of aid on local health expenditures and
intergovernmental transfers was conducted in the last section in a simple theoretical frame-
work, with only one level of health care services. In this section, I present the comparative
statics effects of foreign aid when the health care sector is characterized by two level of health
care, the primary and secondary health care. The motivation behind this introduction is
to explore another source of aid fungibility. Indeed, donors tend to prioritize primary care
services to respond to high-need individuals that do not have the financial capacity to use
these services (such as the poor living in rural areas with limited access to health facilities).
But it also refers to the donor’s imperfect information about the whole health sector,
creating discrepancies between the decision of the donor and the central government to
allocate health resources optimally. Consequently, the optimal response of the recipient gov-
ernment could be to divert health resources to higher level of care leading to fungibility of aid.
Suppose that the central government is responsible for financing a higher level of care (e.g.
national public hospital). The consumption of this service is valued v(θk, a
h
k) by individuals
of type k. The function v(θk, .) is assumed to be increasing, smooth and strictly concave in
its second argument. Denote mi the unit cost of providing secondary health care services
per capita in community i. I assume that in each community i, the unit cost of secondary
care is higher than the unit cost of primary care, mi > qi.
For simplicity, I assume that the primary and secondary health care services are only
used by the poor and ill subgroup in each community4. However, the federal government
uses an income tax τ on the rich to finance its health expenditures. As before, local
health expenditures Gi (which are now referred to as primary care) are financed by local
governments through user fees, fiscal grant, ag, and possibly foreign aid, d. Individuals
value the two goods differently depending on each level of consumption. In particular,
4This assumption only simplifies the calculations but does not affect the overall findings detailed below
insofar as the donor only cares about the poor.
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h′(0) > v′(0) > h′(G¯i) where G¯i represents the minimum amount of primary care services
such that v′(θik, a
h
k) > h
′(θik, Gi) for all Gi > G¯i. As before, I assume that di > a
g
i in every
community.
Unconditional aid
Given its preferences for the ill and healthy individuals, the central government solves
the following problem
max
ag ,ah
∑
i
Ni{πiµ
c
ip[h(θiP , giP + a
g
i + di) + v(θiP , a
h
i )]}
subject to the central government budget constraints∑
i
qia
g
i +
∑
i
mia
h
i ≤
∑
i
Ni(1− πi)yiτ (22)
gi + di + a
g
i ≤ G¯i (23)
The last constraint denotes the central government willingness to invest in the higher
level of care once the primary health care facilities have reached the investment threshold.
Under the assumption that the donor solely focuses on primary health care, the optimal
public provision of the federal government is to allocate the minimum health resources to
reach this threshold. If the donor’s resources, di, in community i, do not exceed G¯i− gi−a
g
i ,
the constraint never binds. Hence, for the sake of interest, I assume that gi + di = G¯i − ǫ.
Consequently, the central government only needs to transfer a minimum health resource ag
to reach the primary health care threshold.
At community i level, the optimal provision of health resources between primary care
and higher level of care is determined by the following first-order conditions:
Niπiµ
c
iPh2(θiP , giP + a
g
ip + di)− λ1qi − λ2 = 0 (24)
Niπiµ
c
iPv2(θiP , a
h
ip)− λ1mi = 0 (25)
where λ1 and λ2 denote the Lagrange multiplier attached to the constraints (22) and (23)
respectively. Combining (24) and (25), I obtain the marginal rate of substitution between
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the consumption of the primary care good and the secondary health care good:
MRSa
gah
i =
h2(θiP , giP + a
g
iP )
v2(θiP , ahiP )
=
1
mi
(qi +
λ2
λ1
) (26)
The absence of the donor (d = 0) implies that the constraint (23) is non-binding and
MRSa
gah
i = qi/mi < 1. Consequently, the optimal resource transfer from the central
government is such that ag > ah. This inequality reflects the higher investment of the
federal government in primary health care in absence of foreign aid. On the other hand,
the presence of the donor (d > 0) results in the binding constraint (23) and MRSa
gah
i > 1,
provided that qi + λ2/λ1 > mi. The optimal transfer of health resources from the central
government is characterized by a higher allocation of resources to secondary health care
services (ag < ah). Notice that λ2 is the marginal utility of total health expenditures when
they meet the threshold G¯i. Hence, a surge in foreign aid generates a reallocation of central
government resources from primary to secondary health care if the marginal health benefit
of the sick at G¯i is large enough.
So far, the optimal allocation analysis within the health sector has been treated only
under of the donor’s unrestricted budget support to the local government, and I shall now
turn to examine the implication of conditional aid.
Conditional aid
As before, the donor targets successfully the high-need subgroup with community i with
a probability p2. Consequently, the donor’s misallocation of funds may reduce the level
of primary care services for the high-need individuals while the overall total primary care
expenditures in the community is unchanged. The central government solves the following
maximisation problem:
max
ag ,ah
∑
i
Ni{πiµ
c
ip[h(θiP , giP + a
g
i + di)p2 + h(θiP , giP + a
g
i )(1− p2) + v(θiP , a
h
i )]}
subject to the same constraints of the unconditional problem, (22) and (23) respectively.
From the first-order conditions, the derived optimal health resources are given by:
Niπiµ
c
iP (h2(θiP , giP + a
g
ip + di)p2 ++h2(θiP , giP + a
g
i )(1− p2)− λ1qi − λ2 = 0 (27)
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Niπiµ
c
iPv2(θiP , a
h
ip)− λ1mi = 0 (28)
This yields to the marginal rate of substitution between the consumption of the primary
care and the secondary health care good:
MRSa
gah
i =
h2(θiP , giP + a
g
ip + di)p2 ++h2(θiP , giP + a
g
i )(1− p2)
v2(θiP , ahiP )
=
1
mi
(qi +
λ2
λ1
) (29)
In the presence of foreign aid, the constraint (23) is binding and MRSa
gah
i > 1. However the
comparison of (29) with (26) indicates that the marginal rate of substitution between the
consumption of primary care and secondary care services is lower in the case of conditional
aid (because the marginal utility of health care services consumption is lower for the low-need
group). This result implies that the conditionality of aid reduces the ability of the central
government to transfer health resources from primary care to secondary care services when
the probability of the donor to target the low-need group increases.
Proposition 6. Conditional aid reduces health resources to secondary health care services
transferred from the central government when the probability of the donor to target success-
fully the high-need group is lower than one.
Hence, conditional aid limits the reallocation of the central government’s funding from
primary to secondary health care.
5 Conclusion
The issue of fungibility of aid has been widely explored in the related theoretical literature
through the lens of the Principal-Agent model. Within this approach, the donor can write a
contract that specifies where the funds are to be spent based on the observable consequences
of the recipient’s actions (outcomes produced or inputs used). The objective of the donor is
then to restrain the recipient from self-interested efforts. The use of this setting is justified
on the basis that the donor has perfect information about the needs in the recipient country
but is unable to observe the recipient’s actions. However, I show in this work that these
results might be sensitive to the information structure.
I develop a model that departs from the analytical approach used in the Principal-Agent
setting by assuming (1) that the donor does not have perfect information about the local
needs in the recipient country, and (2) that the recipient country does not engage in self-
interested efforts upon receiving foreign aid. The novelty of my approach is to examine how
30
foreign aid affects the intergovernmental transfers of health resources in a federal structure
system and to assess its implications on local health expenditures. Asymmetric information is
characterized by the donor and central government’s imperfect observation of the local needs
while the local government has full observability. In this theoretical setting, the assumptions
of the contract theory no longer hold, and I employ a comparative statics analysis of the
effects of foreign aid on local health expenditures and intergovernmental transfers.
I distinguish among several cases characterised by the existence of conditionality of for-
eign aid and fiscal grants. Intuitively, one might expect that funds transferred as unrestricted
budget support to the local government contribute to the fungibility issue and the ineffec-
tiveness of aid, compared to the case where aid is conditional or used to finance directly
a specific program. However, when the local government is committed to maximising the
social welfare of the ill (and poor) individuals and the donor has limited information about
which group in the local community has the highest health need, I find that unconditional
aid generates the maximum welfare gain for the high-need group. I also find that conditional
aid has more of an increasing effect on the local health expenditures than unrestricted budget
support. However, this increase in local government spending on the high-need individuals
is the result of the local government’s efforts to compensate for the inappropriate allocation
of the donor’s funding to the low-need group in the community. As the probability of the
donor to successfully target the high-need group raises, the expansionary effect of foreign aid
on the local government expenditures diminishes. This result suggests that conditionality of
aid could have disruptive effects on the recipient’s health system when the donor has imper-
fect information and the local government is committed to reducing the burden of disease
of the high-need group. In this setting, the apparent decrease of aid fungibility associated
with conditional aid is the result of local government attempts to compensate for the donor’s
misallocation.
When there are two levels of health care provision and the donor earmarks aid to
primary care services, the central government is forced to reduce health resources dedicated
to the secondary level in order to increase those of the primary health care sector. This
situation gives rise to suboptimal health outcomes when the secondary health sector is
under-allocated and the marginal health benefit of secondary health services is higher than
that of primary health services. This result highlights the potentially disruptive effects of
conditionality of aid on the recipient health system.
Limited data on the source of most new infections in a given country and which inter-
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ventions are most effective in which settings reduces the ability of the donors to allocate
health resources most strategically. These findings illuminate the need for engaging the
recipient country in health strategies. When local communities have perfect information
about the distribution of health need, country ownership of foreign aid increases the effi-
ciency of aid. One challenge is the presence of multiple donors with different objectives
and preferences that make it practically impossible for the recipient government to use the
whole external resources optimally. It is likely that the multitude of aid assistance creates
externalities even within the health sector that give raise to inefficiencies. Measuring the
impact of one specific program by ignoring the presence of other donors or interventions is
likely to produced biased results. Ownership of health priorities by low-income countries and
collaborative partnership among the various global health partners should be key priorities.
An interesting future research would be to incorporate the externalities generated by pro-
gram interventions among multiple donors in a specific community to evaluate the overall
health outcome with respect to the donors’ objectives. Empirical research could also provide
support on the model developed in this research by estimating the effects of conditional aid
and unconditional budget support on domestic health expenditures at sub-national levels
(district and community level).
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Appendix
A Local public provision of health care with domestic resources
Proofs of Unconditional fiscal grant
If the central government decides to transfer an unconditional (without use restrictions)
lump sum grant per capita ai to community i, the optimal local expenditures for the provision
of health services selected by the local government solves
Max
Gc
iP
,Gc
iR
{πiµiPh(θP , G
c
iP ) + (1− πi)µiR[h(θR, G
c
iR)− cigiR]}
subject to the budget constraint:
qi(G
c
i)G
c
i ≤ (1− πi)cigiR + a
g
i qi(G
c
i)
where the total provision of the private good for group k is denoted by Gcik = gik + a
g
i
with gi = πigip + (1− πi)giR.
Note that Gci = πiG
c
iP + (1 − πi)G
c
iR. Inserting the budget constraint into the objective
function of the local government by replacing cigiR and the first-order condition writes:
πiµiPh2(θP , G
c
iP )− µiRπi[q
′
i(G
c
i)G
c
i + qi(G
c
i)] + µiRπia
g
i q
′
i(G
c
i) = 0
h2(θP , G
c
iP ) =
µiR
µiP
q′i(G
c
i)(G
c
i − a
g
i ) + q(G
c
i)
=
µiR
µiP
q′i(G
c
i)gi + q(G
c
i)
since Gci = gi + a
g
i . Likewise, the FOC with respect to the second argument lead to:
(1− πi)µiRh2(θP , G
c
iR)− µiR(1− πi)[q
′
i(G
c
i)G
c
i + qi(G
c
i)] + µiR(1− πi)a
g
i q
′
i(G
c
i) = 0
Hence,
h2(θP , G
c
iR) = q
′
i(G
c
i)(G
c
i − a
g
i ) + q(G
c
i)
= q′i(G
c
i)gi + q(G
c
i)
33
Proofs of Conditional fiscal grant
The marginal propensity to spend on the sick out of conditional grant is obtained by
applying the implicit function theorem on the first order-condition (9) gives:
∂g∗P
∂ag
= −
h22(θP , gP )p1 −
µR
µP
(q′′(Gc)g + q′(Gc)
h22(θP , GcP )p1 + h22(θP , gP )(1− p1)− π
µR
µP
(q′′(Gc)g + 2q′(Gc))
= −
(
1−
h22(θP , gP )(1− p1) +
µR
µP
(q′′(Gc)g + q′(Gc)− π µR
µP
(q′′(Gc)g + 2q′(Gc)
h22(θP , GcP )p1 + h22(θP , gP )(1− p1)− π
µR
µP
(q′′(Gc)g + 2q′(Gc))
)
= −
1− 1− p1 + µRµP q′′(Gc)g+2q′(Gc)(1−pi)−q′(Gc)h22(θP ,gP )
p1
h22(θP ,G
c
P
)
h22(θP ,gP )
+ 1− p1 − π
µR
µP
q′′(Gc)g+2q′(Gc)
h22(θP ,gP )

= −
1− 1− p1 + µRµP κc(1−pi)−q′(Gc)h22(θP ,gP )
p1
h22(θP ,G
c
P
)
h22(θP ,gP )
+ 1− p1 − π
µR
µP
κc
h22(θP ,gP )

with κc = q
′′(Gc)g + 2q′(Gc).
B Public provision of health care resources with foreign aid
Proof of case 1: Grant a and aid d unconditional
Totally differentiating (13) yields the following marginal propensity to spend out of aid:
∂g∗P
∂d
= −(a′(d) + 1)
h22(θP , G
d
P )−
µR
µP
(q′′(Gd)g + q′(Gd)
h22(θP , GdP )− π
µR
µP
(q′′(Gd)g + 2q′(Gd)
= −(a′(d) + 1)
(
1−
µR
µP
(q′′(Gd)g + q′(Gd)− π µR
µP
(q′′(Gd)g + 2q′(Gd)
h22(θP , GdP )− π
µR
µP
(q′′(Gd)g + 2q′(Gd)
)
= −(a′(d) + 1)
(
1−
µR
µP
(1− π)κd −
µR
µP
q′(Gd)
h22(θP , GdP )− π
µR
µP
κd
)
= −(a′(d) + 1)
(
1−
1− π − q
′(Gd)
κd
π˜d − π
)
with π˜d =
h22(θP ,G
d
p)
κd
µP
µR
and κd = q
′′(Gd)g + 2q′(Gd).
Case 3. Conditional grant a and unconditional aid d
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In this situation, the local government allocates its local resources g as well as the external
funding that it receives from the donor. However, it has no control over the allocation of the
federal grant a. The optimal resource allocations solve the problem:
max
G
gd
P
,G
gd
R
[
πµPW
P (θP , G
d
P ) + (1− π)µRW
R(θR, gR)
]
p1
+
[
πµPW
P (θP , G
s
P ) + (1− π)µRW
R(θR, G
c
pR)
]
(1− p1)
s.t. q(Gd)Gs ≤ (1− π)cgR + dq(G
d)
where GsP = gP + d and G
s = g + d. The local government’s first-order conditions yield
to:
∂W P (θP , G
d
p)
∂GsP
p1 +
∂W P (θP , G
s
P )
∂GsP
(1− p1) =
µR
µP
q(Gd)
(
1 +
1
e(Gd)
g
Gd
)
(30)
Sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique maximum are
h22(θP , G
d
P )p1 + h22(θP , G
s
P )(1− p1)−
µR
θPµP
(q′′(Gd)g + q′(Gd)) < 0
Unconditional aid transfer to the local government coupled with a conditional grant leads
to similar results to the previous case. The welfare loss of conditional grant is given by
the probability of the central government to misallocate its funds (targeting the low-need)
and the social welfare difference between W (GdP ) and W (G
s
P ). In particular, if the share
of foreign aid on total health expenditures is high and close to unity, the welfare loss of
conditional grant becomes marginal. Totally differentiating (30), the effects of aid on local
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health expenditures are given by:
∂g∗P
∂d
= −
(a′(d) + 1)h22(θP , G
d
P )p1 + h22(θP , G
s
P )(1− p1)− (a
′(d) + 1)µR
µP
(q′′(Gd)g + q′(Gd)
h22(θP , GdP )p1 + h22(θP , G
s
P )(1− p1)− π
µR
µP
(q′′(Gd)g + 2q′(Gd))
(31)
= −(a′(d) + 1)
(
1−
h22(θP , G
s
P )(1−
1
a′(d)+1
)(1− p1) +
µR
µP
(κd − q
′(Gd)− πκd)
h22(θP , GdP )p1 + h22(θP , G
s
P )(1− p1)− π
µR
µP
κd
)
(32)
= −(a′(d) + 1)
(
1−
h22(θP , G
s
P )
a′(d)
a′(d)+1
(1− p1) +
µR
µP
(
κd(1− π)− q
′(Gd)
)
θP , GdP )p1 + h22(θP , G
s
P )(1− p1)− π
µR
µP
κd
)
(33)
= −(a′(d) + 1)
1− a′(d)a′(d)+1 π˜s(1− p1)− q′(Gd)κd + 1− π
π˜dp1 + π˜s(1− p1)− π
 (34)
where
π˜k =
h22(θP , G
k
p)
κd
µP
µR
The effects of foreign aid on local health expenditures critically depend on the sign of
a′(d). If the central government decides to tie its fiscal grant to the presence of foreign aid
(a′(d) > 0), then local expenditures increase.
Comparing (31) with the case of unconditional aid and grant (14), the impact of an
conditional grant on the partial effect of aid on local government spending depends on the
sign of a′(d)/(a′(d) + 1)π˜s(1 − p1) − q
′(Gd)/κd
5. When this term is positive, conditional
grant increases the effects of aid on local health expenditures to the high-need. However the
positivity condition cannot hold if the central government has almost perfect information
about local health need (p1 close to 1) or if the effect of aid on fiscal grant is insignificant
(a′(d) close to 0). In such cases, conditional grant reduces the effect of aid on the local
health expenditures to the high-need group.
In addition, since conditional grant funding increases with foreign aid, the local government
can reduce its own health expenditures. Nonetheless, this effect is mitigated by the prob-
ability that the central government incorrectly assesses the local needs of each subgroup.
5The case where a′(d) < 0 is omitted as it constitutes a straightforward source of fungibility of aid.
However, this case can be easily included in the reasoning below, and will be mostly the opposite of the
results obtained when the marginal effect of aid on fiscal grant is positive.
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Consequently, the maximum effect of external aid on local expenditures is reached when
p1 = 0 and decreases with p1 increasing.
The comparison of case 2 (18) and case 3 (31) leads to more ambiguous results and
depends on the probabilities of the donor and the central government to successfully target
the high-need group, as well as the central government’s response to foreign aid. When
both the central government and the donor have perfect information (p1 = p2 = 1), the
case where fiscal grant is conditional (case 2) has lower increasing effect on the local health
expenditures propensity to spend out of aid than the case where aid is conditional (case
3), provided that d > a. The logic behind this mimics the proof in case 2 (conditional aid
and unconditional grant): since the local government increases its health care spending to
compensate the misallocation of resources from either the donor or the central government,
the marginal propensity to spend out of aid depends directly on probability that local needs
are correctly assessed and on the quantity of health resources transferred.
The effects of an conditional grant on local government spending in the presence of
unconditional aid are obtained from totally differentiating the first-order condition:
∂g∗P
∂a
= −
h22(θP , G
d
P )p1 −
µR
µP
(q′′(Gd)g + q′(Gd)
h22(θP , GdP )p1 + h22(θP , G
s
P )(1− p1)− π
µR
µP
(q′′(Gd)g + 2q′(Gd)
(35)
= −
(
1−
h22(θP , G
s
P )(1− p1) +
µR
µP
(q′′(Gd)g + q′(Gd)− π µR
µP
(q′′(Gd)g + 2q′(Gd)
h22(θP , GdP )p1 + h22(θP , G
s
P )(1− p1)− π
µR
µP
(q′′(Gd)g + 2q′(Gd)
)
(36)
= −
1− (1− p1) + µRµP κd(1−pi)−q′(Gd)h22(θP ,GsP )
h22(θP ,G
d
P
)
h22(θP ,G
s
P
)
p1 + 1− p1 − π
µR
µP
κd
h22(θP ,G
s
P
)
 (37)
= −
(
1−
(1− p1)π˜
s + 1− π − q
′(Gd)
κd
p1π˜d + (1− p1)π˜s − π
)
(38)
with π˜s =
h22(θP ,G
s
p)
κd
µP
µR
.
Comparing the case where the donor is absent (12) with (35) reveals that these effects
are ambiguous. Assuming κj < 0, the comparative effects of an conditional grant in the
presence and the absence of foreign aid depends on the difference in the marginal rate of
substitution between conditional grant with unconditional aid and conditional aid alone. It
37
means that the level of local health expenditures critically depends on the effects of aid on
the marginal health benefit of high-need individuals.
Proposition 7. If the donor’s intervention has a significantly large effect on the marginal
health benefit of the high-need members or when p1 is large enough, the local government’s
marginal propensity to spend out of conditional grant is higher with foreign aid than without
it.
Proof. Compare the effects of conditional grant with (35) and without (12) foreign aid. The
condition under which foreign aid negatively affects the marginal propensity to spend out of
conditional grant is
h22(θP , G
d
P )
h22(θP , GsP )
p1 + 1− p1 − π
µR
µP
κd
h22(θP , GsP )
>
h22(θP , G
c
P )
h22(θP , gP )
p1 + 1− p1 − π
µR
µP
κc
h22(θP , gP )
p1(
h22(θP , G
c
P )
h22(θP , gP )
−
h22(θP , G
d
P )
h22(θP , GsP )
) < π
µR
µP
(
κc
h22(θp, gp)
−
κd
h22(θp, Gsp)
)
In addition, κc > κd (if κj < 0) and gP < G
s
P = gP + d. Hence one of the condition under
which this last inequality is satisfied is when p1 is close enough to 0.
The other condition comes from the comparison of the numerators between (35) and (12).
In particular, foreign aid deteriorates the marginal propensity to spend out of conditional
grant if
κc(1− π)− q
′(Gc)
h22(θP , gP )
>
κd(1− π)− q
′(Gd)
h22(θP , GsP )
This last inequality is ambiguous as κc > κd and h22(θP , gP ) < h22(θP , G
s
P ). Therefore, this
inequality holds if the effect of foreign aid on the marginal health benefit of the high-need
groups is small enough.
Provided that foreign aid has significant impact on the marginal health benefit of the
high-need, local government expenditures rise with external funding. However, when the
probability of the central government to rightly target the high-need group is low or when
the amount of foreign aid d is small enough, this result does not hold and the donor
funds exacerbate the reduction in local expenditures. This result holds even if the local
government cares only about high-need individuals (µR = 0). On the other hand, if the
local government only maximizes the welfare of the low-need group, then the presence of
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foreign aid increases the local government’s expenditures for health care services toward the
sick when the fiscal grant is conditional.
Proofs of Case 4. Conditional grant a and aid d
I use the Implicit Function Theorem to derive the marginal effect of foreign aid on the
optimal local health expenditures.
dg∗P
dd
=
−
(a′(d) + 1)h22(θP , G
d
P )p1p2 + a
′(d)h22(θP , G
c
P )p1(1− p2)
h22(θP , GdP )p1p2 + h22(θP , G
c
P )p1(1− p2) + h22(θP , G
s
P )(1− p1)p2 + h22(θP , gP )(1− p1)(1− p2)− pi
µR
µP
κd
−
h22(θP , G
s
P )(1− p1)p2 − (a
′(d) + 1)µR
µP
(κd − q
′(Gd)
h22(θP , GdP )p1p2 + h22(θP , G
c
P )p1(1− p2) + h22(θP , G
s
P )(1− p1)p2 + h22(θP , gP )(1− p1)(1− p2)− pi
µR
µP
κd
Define π˜k =
h22(θp,Gkp)
κd
µP
µR
. Then,
dg∗P
dd
= −
(a′(d) + 1)pidp1p2 + a
′(d)picp1(1− p2) + pi
s(1− p1)p2 − (a
′(d) + 1)(1− q
′(Gd)
κd
)
pidp1p2 + picp1(1− p2) + pis(1− p1)p2 + pigP (1− p1)(1− p2)− pi
= −(a′(d) + 1)
1− a′(d)a′(d)+1p2(1− p1)pis + 1a′(d)+1p1(1− p2)pic + (1− p1)(1− p2)pigP + 1− pi − q′(Gd)κd
p1p2pid + p2(1− p1)pis + p1(1− p2)pic + (1− p1)(1− p2)pigP − pi

I should then examine the special case when the local government only cares about the
sick (µR/µP = 0). In this scenario, equation (20) becomes
∂g∗P
∂d
∣∣∣
µP
µR
=0
= −(a′(d) + 1)
(
1−
a′(d)
a′(d)+1
p2(1−p1)h22(θP ,G
s
P )+
1
a′(d)+1
p1(1−p2)h22(θP ,G
c
P )+(1−p1)(1−p2)h22(θP ,gP )
p1p2h22(θP ,G
d
P
)+p2(1−p1)h22(θP ,G
s
P
)+p1(1−p2)h22(θP ,G
c
P
)+(1−p1)(1−p2)h22(θP ,gP )
)
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Consider the difference in equations (35) and (21). It follows that:
∂g∗P
∂a
∣∣∣∣
case3
−
∂g∗P
∂a
∣∣∣∣
case4
=
(1− p1)π˜
s + 1− π − q
′(Gd)
κd
p1π˜d + (1− p1)π˜s − π
−
π˜s(1− p1)p2 + π˜
gP (1− p1)(1− p2) + 1− π −
q′(Gd)
κd
p1p2π˜d + p2(1− p1)π˜s + p1(1− p2)π˜c + (1− p1)(1− p2)π˜gP − π
Define the difference in the numerator as
A = (1− p1)π˜
s − (π˜s(1− p1)p2 + π˜
gP (1− p1)(1− p2)) = (1− p1)(1− p2) (π˜
s − π˜gP ) > 0
if 0 < p1 < 1 and 0 < p2 < 1 since π˜
s > π˜gP . In addition, define B as the difference in the
denominators:
B = p1π˜
d + (1− p1)π˜
s −
(
p1p2π˜
d + p2(1− p1)π˜
s + p1(1− p2)π˜
c + (1− p1)(1− p2)π˜
gP
)
= p1(1− p2)π˜
d + (1− p1)(1− p2)π˜
s − (p1(1− p2)π˜
c + (1− p1)(1− p2)π˜
gP )
= (1− p1)(1− p2)
(
π˜s − π˜gP +
p1
1− p1
(π˜d − π˜c)
)
> 0
if 0 < p1 < 1 and 0 < p2 < 1 since π˜
d > π˜c and π˜s > π˜gP . It follows that B > A, then
∂g∗P
∂a
∣∣∣∣
case3
<
∂g∗P
∂a
∣∣∣∣
case4
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